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Nondelegation Canons
Cass R. Sunstein*
I. Introduction
It is often said that the nondelegation doctrine is dead.1
According to the familiar refrain,2 the doctrine was once used to
require Congress to legislate with some clarity, so as to ensure that
law is made by the national legislature rather than by the executive.
But the nondelegation doctrine—the refrain continues—is now
merely a bit of rhetoric, as the United States Code has become
littered with provisions asking one or another administrative agency
to do what it thinks best.3 While this is an overstatement, it captures
an important truth: Since 1935, the Supreme Court has not struck
down an act of Congress on nondelegation grounds, notwithstanding
the existence of a number of plausible occasions.4
But is the nondelegation doctrine really dead? On the contrary,
I believe that the doctrine is alive and well. It has been relocated
rather than abandoned. Federal courts commonly vindicate not a
general nondelegation doctrine, but a series of more specific and
small, though quite important, nondelegation doctrines. Rather than
invalidating federal legislation as excessively open-ended, courts hold
that federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain
activity unless and until Congress has expressly told them to do so.
The relevant choices must be made legislatively rather than
bureaucratically. As a technical matter, the key holdings are based
not on the delegation doctrine but on certain “canons” of
construction.
What I mean to identify here is the nondelegation canons, not
organized or recognized as such, but central to the operation of
*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Jack
Goldsmith, Jill Hasday, Richard Posner, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable
comments on a previous draft.
1
See John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 131-33 (1981).
2
See id. at 131-34.
3
See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (1995).
4
See below for a brief overview.
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modern public law. These are nondelegation canons for the simple
reason that they forbid administrative agencies from making
decisions on their own.5 Consider a few examples. Congress must
affirmatively authorize the extraterritorial application of federal law6;
agencies cannot exercise their ordinary discretion, under an
ambiguous statutory provision, so as apply national law outside of
American borders. A clear congressional statement to this effect is
required. Administrative agencies are not permitted to construe
federal statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional
questions; if the constitutional question is substantial, Congress must
clearly assert its goal of venturing into the disputed terrain.7 When
treaties and statutes are ambiguous, they must be construed favorably
to Native American tribes; the agencies’ own judgment, if it is an
exercise of discretion, is irrelevant.8 As we will see, there are many
more examples, including a recent canon forbidding agencies to
impose high costs for trivial gains.
In this Essay I have two purposes, descriptive and normative.
The descriptive purpose is to show how certain canons of
construction operate as nondelegation principles. My aim is to unify
a set of seemingly disparate cases and to suggest that they actually
construct a coherent and flourishing doctrine, amounting to the
contemporary nondelegation doctrine.
The second and normative purpose is to show that such canons,
though highly controversial, should be understood as entirely
legitimate. The nondelegation canons have crucial advantages over
the more familiar nondelegation doctrine insofar as they are easily
administrable, pose a less severe strain on judicial capacities, and risk
far less in the way of substantive harm. The nondelegation canons
represent a salutary kind of democracy-forcing minimalism, designed
to ensure that certain choices are made by institutions with a superior
5

Some canons are described as “clear statement” principles, so labeled because
they require a clear statement from Congress. See, e.g., William Eskridge,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 282-83 (1995). The nondelegation canons are
all clear statement principles; but many clear statement principles are not
nondelegation canons, because they do not involve agencies at all. See note infra.
6
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, 499 US 244 (1991) (extraterritoriality).
7
See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ Hospital, 488 US 204 (1988).
8
Muscagee Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439 (DC Cir 1988) (construction in
favor of Native Americans).
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democratic pedigree.9 Indeed, the nondelegation canons turn out to
be a contemporary manifestation of the founding effort to link
protection of individual rights, and other important interests, with
appropriate institutional design.10 In certain cases, Congress must
decide the key questions on its own. This is the enduring function of
the nondelegation doctrine, and it is endorsed, not repudiated, by
current law.
II. The Conventional Nondelegation Doctrine:
One Good Year11
Despite its exceptionally infrequent use, the conventional
nondelegation doctrine—the doctrine that has been displaced by the
contemporary nondelegation canons—should be quite familiar. In a
nutshell, it requires Congress to state an “intelligible principle” by
which to guide and limit agency action.12 The motivating idea is that
Article I, section 113 vests legislative power in the Congress and that
this vesting cannot be waived, even if Congress and the public want
to waive it. If Congress gives the executive a “blank check,” or states
no intelligible principle, it has violated Article I. Sometimes the
nondelegation doctrine is thought to diminish the risk of rentseeking, or legislation that reduces social welfare, by requiring a
legislative consensus on details before permitting the enactment of
law.
According to the standard view, the nondelegation doctrine was
a core part of the original Constitution, and its abandonment, in the
aftermath of the New Deal, represented a kind of capitulation to

9
On minimalism and democracy-forcing minimalism generally, see Cass R.
Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999).
10
See Williams Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason 5-27 (1995).
11
In this section I draw on a companion paper, Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean
Air Act Unconstitutional?, Michigan Law Review (forthcoming November
1999), which focuses on issues of EPA discretion and regulatory policy, and
which offers a brief discussion of the basic claims of this essay.
12
See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (DC
1971)
13
U.S. Const., Art. 1. Section 1.
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perceived national needs.14 But this view is much too simple. There
is no unambiguous textual barrier to delegations—no constitutional
provision says that the legislative power is nondelegable—and in fact
there is no explicit evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the
original Constitution believed that it contained a nondelegation
doctrine.15 Actually the early practice suggested considerable
willingness to “delegate” authority. In the very first year of the
Republic, Congress gave the President the power to grant licenses to
trade with the Indian tribes “under such rules and regulations as the
President shall prescribe.”16 The first Congress also provided for
military pensions “under such regulations as the President of the
United States may direct.”17 In neither case did Congress issue
standards by which to limit the President’s discretion.
The standard view also fits uncomfortably with judicial practice.
It is often remarked that the Supreme Court last used the
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a federal statute in 1935. What
is less often remarked is that the Court first used the nondelegation
doctrine to invalidate to federal statute in exactly the same year.
While earlier cases had suggested the existence of a nondelegation
doctrine,18 the Court upheld a number of broad delegations,19 and
14

See David Schoenbrod, Power and Responsibility (1997); John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust 131-34 (1981); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 100 Harv. L. Rev. (1995).
15
Consider in this regard the treatment of the interpretive question in Ernest
Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 Am. U L Rev 345. 347-48 (1987),
which attempts to show the constitutional roots of the nondelegation (a) by
showing that John Locke believed in a nondelegation principle, (b) by
emphasizing that the framers believed in Locke’s contractarian view, and (c) by
referring to the Constitution’s provision for lawmaking. None of this establishes
that the framers accepted a nondelegation doctrine. I use this example because
Gellhorn is one of the outstanding administrative law scholars of the last thirty
years, and also an enthusiast for the nondelegation doctrine; his inability to show
a direct constitutional source for the doctrine shows that any judgment on its
behalf is largely a matter of inferences.
16
1 Stat. 137.
17
1 Stat. 95.
18
The Brig Aurora, 11 US 382 (1813); Field v. Clark, 143 US 649 (1892);
United States v. Grimaud, 220 US 506 (1911); JW Hampton, Jr. v. US, 276 US
394 (1928).
19
See, eg, US v. Grimaud, 220 US 506 (1911); JW Hampton, Jr. v. US, 276 US
394 (1928).
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hence for the first 138 years of the nation’s existence—as well as the
last 64 years—no Supreme Court decision struck down a statute on
nondelegation grounds. By way of preface to the contemporary
nondelegation canons, let us briefly explore the two decisions of
1935, the conventional nondelegation doctrine’s only good year.
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,20 the Court invalidated a
section of the National Industrial Recovery Act, saying that “the
President is authorize to prohibit the transportation in interstate
commerce” of oil priced in violation of state-imposed production
quotas. The Court concluded that the defect lay in the absence of
standards specifying exactly when the President was to exercise this
power.21 This is a controversial ruling, fitting poorly with postWorld War II decisions,22 and it is most unlikely that the Court
would follow it today. But the largest decision, one that has not been
overruled even implicitly, was Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States,23
where the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act as
a whole.24 In invalidating the Act, the Court made four critical
points. First, the statutory standards were open-ended and selfcontradictory—no constraint at all on government approval of
“codes.”25 From the statutory language, it was very hard to generate
ceilings and floors on governmental action. Second, the Court said
that the Act essentially delegated public power to private groups.26
Congress could not legitimately authorize private persons to create
law in their preferred form. Because accountable officials did not
“filter” efforts at private lawmaking, this did not merely raise the
spectre of faction, it was the thing itself—the cooptation of public
power by self-interested private groups.27 Third, the Court
distinguished other statutes, most notably the Federal Trade
20

293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Id. at 395.
22
See below.
23
295 US 495 (1935).
24
It is an interesting historical fact that on the day of the decision, President
Roosevelt did not seem much to object to judicial invalidation of a centerpiece of
his New Deal, apparently on the theory that the NIRA experiment had been a
failure. See Kenneth C. Davis, FDR: The New Deal Years (1988).
25
295 U.S. at 523.
26
Id. at 537.
27
Id.
21

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

6

Commission Act and the Federal Communications Act, partly by
reference to the procedural safeguards provided by those statutes.
“What are ‘unfair methods of competition’ are thus to be determined
in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of particular
competitive conditions and of what is found to be a specific and
substantial public interest. To make this possible, Congress set up a
special procedure.”28 Fourth, the statute at issued covered the entire
economy, no mere sector, and thus placed the economy itself at the
mercy of decisions essentially unlimited by legislative instructions.
In the decades since Schechter Poultry, however, nondelegation
challenges have been routinely repudiated.29 Indeed, the Court has
upheld some apparently extreme grants of authority to the executive
branch.30 To be sure, there have been a few conflicting signals. In the
most visible opinion in what is generally known as the Benzene
Case, then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that Occupational Safety and
Health Act should be struck down on nondelegation grounds.31
Notably, Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion also referred to the
nondelegation doctrine, not to invalidate the Act but as a tool of
statutory construction.32 In the plurality’s view, the agency’s position
would allow the agency such massive power over the private sector as
to be a possibly unconstitutional delegation of power.33 Partly for this
reason, the Court read the statute to require OSHA to show a
“significant risk” before it could undertake regulation.34 For the
plurality, then, the nondelegation doctrine operated as a kind of
“clear statement” principle, or canon of construction rooted in
nondelegation concerns, requiring Congress to speak unambiguously
if it sought to give (what the Court saw as) open-ended authority to

28

Id. at 533.
See, eg, Yakus v. US, 321 US 414 (1944); Lichter v. US, 334 US 742 (1948);
US v. Southwestern Cable Co, 392 US 157 (1968); Mistretta v. US, 488 US 361
(1988).
30
See Yakus, supra; Southwestern Cable Co., supra; Mistretta, supra.
31
Industrial Union Department v. API, 448 US 607, 684 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
32
Id. at 646.
33
Id. at 646.
34
Id. at 651.
29
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administrators.35 As we will see, Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion
created a fresh nondelegation canon, one that fits well with my
general thesis here, and one that carries considerable independent
importance.
In the immediate aftermath of the Benzene Case, there were
occasional lower court suggestions that the nondelegation doctrine
was “no longer . . . moribund.”36 A handful of lower courts cases have
recently invoked the doctrine. Thus in Massieu v. Reno,37 a distict
court struck down a provision of a federal deportation statute saying
that “an alien whose presence or activities in the United States the
Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe would have
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the
United States is deportable.” On the court’s view, this was an openended grant of power, because the notion of “potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences” could be construed in numerous
different ways, thus raising a risk of arbitrariness. And in South
Dakota v. Department of Interior,38 a court of appeals invalidated the
Indian Reorganization Act insofar as it authorized the secretary of
the Interior “in his discretion, to acquire . . . any interest in lands . . .
within or without existing reservations . . . for the purpose of
providing land for Indians.” But these are extremely unusual cases,
and it is unlikely that other courts would follow them, even on
identical facts.39

35

There is much reason to question the plurality’s analysis. OSHA did not urge
that it could do whatever it wanted; it did not say that the statute allowed it to
regulate on whatever terms it chose. On the contrary, it said whenever there was
an identifiable risk to workers, the statute required OSHA to regulate to the
point where compliance was not feasible. This is a severe, even draconian statute,
not so different from the Delaney Clause, which barred any carcinogens in food
additives. 21 USC 376(b)(5)(B). But a draconian statute is not an open-ended
delegation of authority. If Congress told the EPA, eliminate any pollutant that
causes any risk at all, EPA’s discretion would be sharply constrained.
36
Fort Worth & Denver v. Lewis, 693 F.2d 432, 435 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1982).
37
915 F. Supp. 681 (D.N.J. 1996).
38
69 F.3d 878 (DC Cif 1995,.
39
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 US 361 (1988).
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A. What, If Anything, Is The (Conventional) Nondelegation Doctrine
For?
The opinions of Justice Rehnquist and the plurality in the
Benzene Case have spurred renewed interest in the conventional
nondelegation doctrine, and many observers have argued for its
revival.40 There has thus been a spirited debate over what purposes,
democratic, economic and otherwise, that such a revival would serve,
and whether, in light of those purposes, a revival would be justified.41
I briefly discuss that debate, principally to show fatal problems with
any large-scale judicial use of the doctrine, and to pave the way
toward an understanding of the nondelegation canons as the far
superior alternative.
1. The conventional doctrine defended
It is possible to isolate several arguments on behalf of the
conventional doctrine. First and foremost, the doctrine is designed to
promote a distinctive kind of accountability—the kind of
accountability that comes from requiring specific decisions from a
deliberative body reflecting the views of representatives from various
states of the union. This is hardly to say that the executive branch
lacks accountability; of course the President, who is authorized to
oversee most administrative behavior, is subject to the will of
people.42 But the nondelegation doctrine should be associated less
with accountability in the abstract than with the particular
constitutional goal of ensuring a deliberative democracy, one that
involves not only accountability but also certain forms of bargaining
and above all reflectiveness.43 The vesting of lawmaking power in
Congress is designed to ensure the combination of deliberation,
40

See Schoenbrod, supra note; Theodore Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom:
Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative Power, 36 Am. U. L.Rev. 295
(1987).
41
Leading discussions include Schoenbrod, supra note 65; Symposium, 36 Am.
U. L. Rev. 277 (1987); Jerry Mashaw, Chaos, Greed, and Governance (1998);
Peter Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 Cornell L Rev 1 (1982).
42
As emphasized in Jerry Mashaw, supra note, at 145-48, 152-56.
43
See William Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (1994). On deliberative
democracy generally, see Deliberative Democracy (Jon Elster ed. 1998); Jurgen
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1996).
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bargaining, and accountability that comes from a guarantee that
government power cannot be brought to bear on individuals unless
diverse representatives, from diverse places, have managed to agree
on the details. It is notable here that the President emerges from a
“winner-take-all” contest, a sharp contrast to Congress, where local
majorities, but national minorities, are allowed to have some say in
lawmaking. Consider, as an extreme contrast, the early decision by
the German legislature to confer on Adolf Hitler the power to rule
by “decree”; this delegation made possible lawmaking exercises that
would otherwise have been extremely cumbersome, and hence
removed an important check on arbitrary rule.44
A closely related point has to do with the extent to which law
and particularly national legislation sometimes amount to an
infringement on liberty. If no law may be brought to bear against the
public unless diverse members of Congress have been able to agree
on a particular form of words, then there is, on one view, an
important safeguard of freedom. The underlying idea is that people
may not be subject to national legal constraints unless and until there
has been specific legislative authorization for the constraints. This
idea can in turn be associated with social contract theory, allowing
people to maintain certain private law rights unless there has been
explicit authorization for what would otherwise be a common law
wrong.45 Indeed, a prominent if now largely discredited46 canon of
44

See David Currie, The Constitution of the Republic of Germany 109 (1995).
See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 27 (4th
ed. 1999). There is, however, a problem with this conception of freedom, a
particular problem in the aftermath of the New Deal: Why should we think that
the status quo embodies freedom, and that the new law at issue would threaten to
abridge freedom? It is far from clear, for example, that the common law system
for regulating pollution—itself a regulatory system, and anything but
prepolitical—should be taken as an embodiment of liberty, and that a Clean Air
Act is a liberty-threatening abridgement of that freedom. Compare the area of
discrimination: Is a law forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or
disability something that threatens liberty, such that it is crucial to obtain
legislative agreement on its details, lest liberty be threatened? Or might the
discriminatory status quo be the real threat to freedom? Questions of this kind
seem to me to raise serious doubts about the idea that a strictly enforced
nondelegation doctrine would promote liberty, properly conceived. On the
general topic of status quo neutrality, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution (1993).
45

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

10

construction—requiring express legislative authorization for
interference with common law rights47—is a close cousin of this idea;
it qualifies as the core nondelegation canon of the early twentieth
century.
A related point has to do with social welfare. If we believe that
legislation is at least often an effort by self-interested private groups
to redistribute wealth or resources in their favor, the nondelegation
might be seen as welfare-promoting, insofar as it raises the cost of
legislation. On this view, the idea that legislation may not be enacted
unless there is a consensus to this effect (as reflected in agreement on
statutory requirements) is a safeguard against welfare-reducing
legislation, increasing the likelihood that statutes will do more good
than harm. On this view, more stringent enforcement of the
nondelegation doctrine would promote social welfare (economically
defined), by reducing the number of inefficient statutes, and by
increasing the likelihood that enacted law will be efficient. The
nondelegation doctrine might even be understood as an institutional
cousin of a provision that directly prohibited inefficient legislation
(as some people understand the Takings Clause, for example).
The conventional nondelegation doctrine also promotes rule of
law values. Indeed, the doctrine can be understood as a kind of
“backdoor” void-for-vagueness doctrine, serving the same
fundamental goals.48 It does this, first, by promoting planning by
those subject to law, giving them a sense of what is permitted and
what is forbidden. The result is to reduce the cost of litigation and
seeking legal advice. It does this, second, by cabining the
46

Note, however, that in Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v.
Chesapeake & Potomoc Tel. Co., 104 S. Ct. 304, 307 (1983), the Court
described the canon as “well-established.”
47
See, e.g., FTC v. American Tobacco CO., 264 US 298, 305-06 (1924); FTC v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 274 US 619, 623-25 (1927); Felix Frankfurter and Nathan
Greene, The Labor Injunction 168-82 (1930); Roscoe Pound, Common Law
and Legislation, 21 Harv L Rev 383 384, 387-88 (1908).
48
Similarly, the void for vagueness doctrine might be seen as a backdoor
nondelegation doctrine, requiring a legislature to speak with clarity. Both
doctrines are also cousins of the plain meaning rule in statutory construction, see
John Manning, Textualism As A Nondelegation Principle, 97 Colum. L. Rev
673 (1997). They are also closely connected with the project of democracyforcing minimalism. See Sunstein, supra note.
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discretionary authority of enforcement officials, who might otherwise
act abusively or capriciously. These points can be collected with the
suggestion that the conventional nondelegation doctrine reflects the
Constitution’s commitment to dual-branch lawmaking—a
commitment that limits arbitrary power, and promotes deliberation
as well as accountability, by ensuring that governmental authority can
be exercised only when both the legislature and the executive
(ordinarily authorized to decline enforcement) have made a particular
decision to that effect. As we will see, this commitment underlies the
nondelegation canons as well.
2. Against the conventional doctrine
Those who challenge the conventional doctrine emphasize
several points. A large part of their concern is institutional, involving
judicial competence rather than the doctrine on its merits.49 The
difference between a permissible and impermissible
delegation—between “legislative” and “executive” conduct—is one of
degree, not one of kind. It is for this reason that Justice Scalia,
among others, has urged that in its conventional form, the
nondelegation doctrine is largely unenforceable by the federal
judiciary, simply because it is not subject to principled judicial
application.50 Any serious effort to enforce the nondelegation
doctrine is likely (ironically) to increase uncertainty of an important
kind, by forcing people to guess, without clear antecedent guidance,
about how much legislative vagueness is constitutionally forbidden.
With a little hyberbole, we might even suggest that in the hands of
judges, the nondelegation doctrine is itself likely to be void for
vagueness.
These are institutional points; other objections cut deeper
against the doctrine. Sometimes Congress has good reasons to
delegate. It may lack relevant information, not only about pollutants
and the changing telecommunications market, but also about the
social consequences of one or another approach to regulation. It may
49
See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 323,
324-28 (1987).
50
Se Mistrtta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 375 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia’s skepticism about judicial implementation of the nondelegation doctrine
fits very well with his skepticism about rule-free law. See Antonin Scalia, A
Matter of Interpretation 5-15 (1997).
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be aware of the existence of rapidly changing circumstances, which
may make any particular approach increasingly anachronistic. For a
multimember body, there are serious problems in achieving closure
on any particular course of action; the result can be to push law in
the direction of incompletely specified abstractions.51 These points
are independent of the phenomenon of delegating to escape the
political consequences of specificity, a phenomenon that undoubtedly
plays a large role as well.52
The latter point is often taken as a reason for invigorating the
nondelegation doctrine in the name of accountability53; but Jerry
Mashaw has raised the possibility that administrators should be
making political decisions, precisely on grounds of accountability.54
As Mashaw notes, agencies are themselves politically accountable
through their relationship to the President. Indeed, public choice
theory may well suggest that Congress is more, not less, susceptible
to factional power than bureaucrats acting under the arm of the
President. There is evidence that factions are most influential
precisely when Congress legislates with particularity.55 There is no
evidence that social welfare is more likely to be produced via specific
instructions rather than via general ones.
Indeed, the view that the conventional nondelegation doctrine
would promote social welfare is undermined not only by the risk by
greater rent-seeking via clear legislation, but also in light of the fact
that it is highly speculative to suggest that social welfare is, in
general, likely to be promoted by reducing the total volume of law.
Often law promotes social welfare, whatever content we give to that
contested term. In any case this issue cannot be resolved in the
abstract. And it is hard to come up with any a priori reason why
decisions by agencies under vague language would be worse, from the
standpoint of promoting social well-being, than decisions by
agencies under more specific language from Congress. Indeed, it is
51

See Aranson et al., supra note; Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit,
Second-Order Decisions, Ethics (forthcoming 1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
52
See Aranson et al., supra note.
53
See id.; Schoenbrod, supta note.
54
See Mashaw, supra note.
55
See Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1983).
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not clear that from any point of view, things have gone systematically
better when Congress is clear than when Congress is not.56
3. A general conclusion
In light of these considerations, there is no plausible case for a
broad-scale revival of the nondelegation doctrine. A reinvigoration of
the conventional doctrine would pose serious problems of judicial
competence, and it would not be a sensible response to any of the
problems and pathologies of the modern administrative state.57
There is no reason to think that such a reinvigoration would ensure
better regulatory policy, or even that it would mark a significant
improvement in terms of democratic values.
None of this means that the nondelegation doctrine deserves to
play no role at all in the constitutional regime. Contrary to Mashaw’s
suggestion, administrators are often weakly accountable to the
President (or the electorate). By virtue of its composition Congress
has a distinctive kind of accountability, and the special form of
political accountability anticipated by Article I, section 1 does call for
limitations on executive discretion. But outside of the most egregious
cases,58 this requirement is best promoted not by the conventional
doctrine but by the nondelegation canons—the real place where
contemporary American law recognizes a nondelegation doctrine,
and where that doctrine now flourishes.

56

See Stewart, supra note.
If we ask about promoting public welfare, or about agency reputation for
competence and fair-dealing, it appears unimportant to know whether Congress
has spoken with clarity. The Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, was
one of the least well-respected agencies (at least between 1950 and 1980 or so),
and it operated under open-ended statutory terms; the Securities and Exchange
Commission is highly regarded, though its organic statute is similarly openended. The Department of Agriculture is one of the least well-regarded agencies,
and the statutes it administers are frequently all too clear. The Internal Revenue
Service is highly regarded, at least among those who study administrative
agencies, and many of the provisions that it must enforce are highly detailed. In
short: There seems to be no link between clear statutory terms and agency
competence or agency contribution to social well-being. See id.; in the same
spirit, see Breyer, supra note.
58
Schechter Poultry is an obvious example here.
57
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III. Hidden Nondelegation Principles
Let us turn now to a question that bears directly on the current
status of the nondelegation doctrine: What is the authority of
administrative agencies to interpret the law? When Congress has
spoken clearly, everyone agrees that agencies are bound by what
Congress has said. The disputed question has to do with the
authority of agencies to act when Congress has not spoken clearly.
Of course a strong version of the nondelegation doctrine would
suggest that agencies can, in such cases, do nothing, because the
underlying grant of power is effectively void. But short of this
conclusion, what is the allocation of authority to agencies?
A. The Chevron Canon: Aggravating the Delegation Problem?
The place to start is of course Chevron v. NRDC,59 the decision
that dominates modern administrative law.60 There the Supreme
Court held that unless Congress has decided the “precise question at
issue,” agencies are authorized to interpret ambiguous terms as they
see fit, so long as the interpretation is reasonable.61 Chevron creates a
familiar two-step inquiry. The first question is whether Congress has
directly decided the precise question at issue. The second question is
whether the agency interpretation is reasonable. Indeed, Chevron
establishes a novel canon of construction62: In the face of ambiguity,
statutes mean what the relevant agency takes them to mean.
This is an emphatically prodelegation canon, indeed it is the
quintessential prodelegation canon, and some critics have suggested
that Chevron is highly objectionable on nondelegation grounds.63 On
this view, the problem is that under Chevron, agencies are not merely
given authority that is often open-ended; they are also permitted to
interpret the scope of their own authority, at least in the face of
ambiguity.64 A regime in which agencies lacked this authority
59

467 US 837 (1984).
The literature is immense. For an overview, see Stephen Breyer et al.,
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 64-70 (4th ed. 1999).
61
467 US at 841.
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See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 Duke LJ 511.
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See Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the balnace of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452 (1989).
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See id.
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would—it might be claimed—fit better with nondelegation
principles, for under such a regime, agencies would lack the power to
construe statutory terms on their own. On this view, the key point,
explicitly recognized in the case and by its most enthusiastic
defenders, is that Chevron holds that statutory ambiguities are
implicit delegations of interpretive (realistically, law-making)
authority to agencies.65 The opposing view—that ambiguities are not
delegations at all—would fit better with the constitutional structure.
The weakness of this objection stems from the fact that when
statutory terms are ambiguous, there is no escaping delegation. By
hypothesis Congress has not been clear, perhaps because it has been
unable to resolve the issue, perhaps because it did not foresee it. The
recipient of the delegation will be either agencies or courts. If
Chevron is rejected, ambiguous terms will be construed by judges
rather than administrators, and in neither event will hard questions
be made legislatively. Chevron does increase the discretionary
authority of agencies—this is the sense in which it creates a
prodelegation canon—but only in relation to courts. With respect to
the nondelegation question itself, understood through the lens of
Article III, it is neither here nor there.
B. Trumping Chevron: Three Categories of Nondelegation Canons
It is plain, however, that a variety of canons of
construction—what I am calling nondelegation canons—trump
Chevron itself.66 In other words, the agency’s interpretation of law
does not, under current doctrine, prevail if one of the nondelegation
canons is at work. These canons impose important constraints on
administrative authority, for agencies are not permitted to
understand ambiguous provisions to give them authority to venture
in certain directions; a clear congressional statement is necessary.
The nondelegation canons fall in three principal categories. An
important qualification: I do not mean endorse each of the canons
here. The goal at this stage is descriptive, not normative—to see how
65
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they operate as a constraint on administrative power and to
understand how they are justified in practice. It does not matter if
particular canons would turn out, on reflection, to be indefensible.
1. Constitutionally inspired nondelegation canons
A number of nondelegation canons have constitutional origins.
They are designed to promote some goal with a constitutional
foundation. Consider, as the most familiar example, the
(controversial67) idea that agencies will not be permitted to construe
statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional doubts.68
Notice that this principle goes well beyond the (uncontroversial)
notion that agencies should not be allowed to construe statutes so as
to be unconstitutional. The notion appears to be that for
constitutionally sensitive questions (e.g., whether a statute would
intrude on the right to travel, violate the right to free speech, or
constitute a taking) will not be permitted to arise unless the
constitutionally designated lawmaker has deliberately and expressly
chosen to raise them. The only limitations on the principle are that
the constitutional doubts must be serious and substantial, and that
the statute must be fairly capable of an interpretation contrary to the
agency’s own.69 So long as the statute is unclear, and the
constitutional question serious, Congress must decide to raise that
question via explicit statement. This idea trumps Chevron for that
very reason. Executive interpretation of a vague statute is not enough
when the purpose of the canon is to require Congress to make its
instructions clear
Belonging in the same category is the idea that administrative
agencies will not be allowed to interpret ambiguous provisions so as
to preempt state law.70 The constitutional source of this principle is
the evident constitutional commitment to a federal structure, a
commitment that may not be compromised without a congressional
decision to do so—an important requirement in light of the various
safeguards against cavalier disregard of state interests created by the
67
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system of state representation in Congress.71 Notice that there is no
constitutional obstacle to national preemption; Congress is entitled
to preempt state law if it chooses. But there is a constitutional
obstacle of a sort: the preemption decision must be made
legislatively, not bureaucratically.72.
As a third example, consider the notion that unless Congress
has spoken with clarity, agencies are not allowed to apply statutes
retroactively, even if the relevant terms are quite unclear.73 Because
retroactivity is disfavored in the law,74 Congress will not be taken to
have delegated to administrative agencies the authority to decide the
question. The best way to understand this idea is as an institutional
echo of the notion that the due process clause forbids retroactive
application of law.75 Of course the constitutional constraints on
retroactivity are now modest; while the ex post facto clause forbids
retroactive application of the criminal law, the clause is narrowly
construed, and Congress is generally permitted to impose civil
legislation retroactively if it chooses.76 But there is an institutional
requirement here. Congress must make that choice explicitly and
take the political heat for deciding to do so. It will not be taken to
have attempted the same result via delegation, and regulatory
agencies will not be taken to have the authority to choose
retroactivity on their own. Perhaps part of the motivation here is
uncertainty about the failure to apply the ex post facto clause, or the
due process clause, so as to call into constitutional question some
retroactive applications of civil law.
Consider, finally, the rule of lenity, which says that in the face of
ambiguity, criminal statutes will be construed favorably to criminal
71

See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 Colum L.
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defendants. One function of the lenity principle is to ensure against
delegations. Criminal law must be a product of a clear judgment on
Congress’ part. Where no clear judgment has been made, the statute
will not apply because merely it is plausibly interpreted, by courts or
enforcement authorities, to fit the case at hand. The rule of lenity is
inspired by the due process constraint on conviction pursuant to
open-ended or vague statutes. While it is not itself a constitutional
mandate, it is rooted in a constitutional princple, and serves as a
time-honored nondelegation canon.
2. Structurally inspired nondelegation canons
The second category of nondelegation canons contains
principles that lack a constitutional source but that have a structural
foundation in widespread understandings about the nature of
governmental authority. Consider here the fact that agencies are not
permitted to apply statutes outside of the territorial borders of the
United States.77 If statutes are to receive extraterritorial application, it
must be as a result of a deliberate congressional judgment to this
effect. The notion here is that extraterritorial application calls for
extremely sensitive judgments involving international relations; such
judgments must be made via the ordinary lawmaking process (in
which the President of course participates). The executive may not
make this decision on its own.
For broadly related reasons, agencies cannot interpret statutes
and treaties unfavorably to Native Americans.78 Where statutory
provisions are ambiguous, the government will not prevail. This idea
is plainly an outgrowth of the complex history of relations between
the United States and Native American tribes, which have semisovereign status; it is an effort to ensure that any unfavorable
outcome will be a product of an explicit judgment from the national
legislature. The institutional checks created by congressional
structure must be navigated before an adverse decision may be made.
Consider, as a final if more controversial illustration, the fact that
agencies are not permitted to waive the sovereign immunity of the
77
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United States, and indeed statutory ambiguity cannot be used by
agencies as a basis for waiver, which must be explicit in legislation.79
Sovereign immunity is a background structural understanding,
defeasible only on the basis of a judgment to that effect by the
national legislature.
3. Nondelegation canons inspired by perceived public policy
The final set of nondelegation canons is designed to
implemented perceived public policy, by, among other things, giving
sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt—and by requiring
Congress itself to speak if it wants to compromise policy that is
perceived as generally held.
There are many examples. Exemptions from taxation are
narrowly construed80; if Congress wants to exempt a group from
federal income tax, it must express its will clearly. A central idea here
may be that such exemptions are often the product of lobbying
efforts by well-organized private groups, and thus a reflection of
factional influence; hence agencies may not create such exemptions
on their own. At the same time, there is a general federal policy
against anticompetitive practices, and agencies will not be permitted
to seize on ambiguous statutory language so as to defeat that policy.81
If Congress wants to make an exception to the policy in favor of
competition, it is certainly permitted to do so. But agencies may not
do so without congressional instruction. So too, it is presumed that
statutes providing veterans’ benefits will be construed generously for
veterans, and agencies cannot conclude otherwise.82 This idea is an
analogue to the notion that statutes will be construed favorably to
Native Americans; both require a congressional judgment is a group
perceived as weak or deserving is going to be treated harshly
In decisions of particular importance for the modern regulatory
state, agencies are sometimes forbidden to require very large
expenditures for trivial or de minimis gains.83 If Congress wants to be
79
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“absolutist” about safety, it is permitted to do so by explicit
statement.84 But agencies will not be allowed to take ambiguous
language in this direction. This is a novel nondelegation principle, a
creation of the late twentieth century. It is an evident response to
perceived problems in modern regulatory policy.85
4. Barriers, catalysts, and minimalism
How intrusive are the nondelegation canons? What kind of
judicial role do they contemplate? Canons of this sort might well be
understood not as barriers but as catalysts, allowing government to
act so long as it does so through certain channels. The effort is to
trigger democratic (in the sense of legislative) processes and to ensure
the forms of deliberation, and bargaining, that are likely to occur in
the proper arenas.
In a sense this understanding—of nondelegation canons as
catalysts—is correct. So long as government is permitted to act when
Congress has spoken clearly, no judicial barrier is in place.86 In this
way, the nondelegation canons are properly understand as a species
of judicial minimalism, indeed democracy-forcing minimalism,
designed to ensure that judgments are made by the democratically
preferable institution.87 As compared with more rigid barriers to
Cosle, 636 F,2d 323, 36-61 (DC Cir 1979); Monsanto Co v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d
947, 955-56 (DC Cir 1979). In a famous essay, Karl Llewellyn contended that
the canons of construction were indeterminate and unhelpful, see Karl Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons about
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950). There has been
a vigorous debate over whether Llewellyn was right, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A
Matter of Interpretation (1998) (rejecting Llewellyn’s claim). Even if Llewellyn is
right, his argument does not undermine the nondelegation canons, which go in a
single direction: against agency discretion. Of course it will be possible that other
canons, for example those involve syntax, will support the agency’s view of the
statute.
84
See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987) (finding no de
minimis exception under the Delaney Clause).
85
See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 10-17 (1993) (discussing the
problem of “the last 10%”).
86
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government action, the conventional nondelegation doctrine itself is
a form of minimalism insofar as it requires Congress to speak with
clarity and does not disable the government entirely. And because
the nondelegation canons are narrower and more specifically
targeted—requiring particular rather than general legislative
clarity—they are more minimalist still.
But this understanding misses an important point.
Nondelegation canons are barriers, and not merely catalysts, with
respect to purely administrative (or executive) judgment on the
matters in question. They erect a decisive barrier to certain
discretionary decisions by the executive. In this respect, at least, the
relevant institutions are blocked.
This point raised a final issue, involving the status of the
nondelegation canons: Suppose that Congress expressly delegates to
administrative agencies the authority to decide (for example) whether
a statute may be applied outside the territory of the United States, or
whether a statute should be construed favorably to Native
Americans, or whether a statute ought to be understood to create a
serious constitutional case. Would such a delegation be
unconstitutional? No clear authority answers this question, for
Congress has never attempted to do anything of this sort. But at first
glance, a delegation of this kind would not seem by itself to violate
the conventional nondelegation doctrine, as currently understood, so
long as Congress has not given the agency a general “blank check,”
which courts are loathe to find.88 Thus the answer appears to be that
the nondelegation canons are merely tools of construction, and that
they should not be taken to forbid Congress from delegating
expressly if it chooses.
On the other hand, the Court suggested otherwise in the only
decision that at all bears on this question. In Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong,89 the Supreme Court actually held that the due process clause
forbids the Civil Service Commission from deciding on its own to
ban aliens from working for the United States Civil Service.90 In the
Court’s view, that decision must be made by Congress or the
President; it cannot be made by agencies alone. The Hampton
88
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decision has had no progeny, and outside of very unusual
circumstances,91 the Court would be most unlikely to say that
Congress cannot delegate to agencies the power of decision, even in
sensitive areas, if it chooses to do so expressly. But notice that
Congress must take the political heat that would undoubtedly be
generated by any such explicit delegation, a point that helps account
for Congress’ failure to delegate authority of that kind. And notice
too that in cases in which a constitutional right is plausibly at stake,
the Court might invoke Hampton and strike down the delegation on
due process grounds.
IV. Canons Reconceived and Redeemed
A. Judicial Administrability and Congressional Lawmaking
Canons of the sort I have defended here are highly controversial.
Judge Posner, for example, fears that some of them create a
“penumbral Constitution,” authorizing judges to bend statutes in
particular directions even though there may in fact be no
constitutional violation.92 But if the argument here is correct, there is
a simple answer to these concerns: The relevant canons operate as
nondelegation principles, and they are designed to ensure that
Congress decides certain contested questions on its own. If this idea
is a core structural commitment of the Constitution, there can be no
problem with its judicial enforcement.
We can go further. As briefly noted above, there are serious
problems with judicial enforcement of the conventional
nondelegation doctrine. A central difficulty here is institutional,
involving judicial competence rather than the doctrine on its merits.93
The distinction between a permitted and a prohibited delegation is
one of degree rather than one of kind, depending on the quantum of
allowed discretion, and that question is not easily subject to
principled judicial enforcement. The difficulty of drawing these lines
makes it reasonable to conclude that for the most part, the ban on
91
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unacceptable delegations is a judicially underenforced norm, and
properly so.94 From the standpoint of improving the operation of the
regulatory state, it is also far from clear that general judicial
enforcement of the doctrine would do much good; for reasons given
above, it might even produce considerable harm.
Compare, along the relevant dimensions, judicial use of the
nondelegation canons. Here the institutional problem is far less
severe. Courts do not ask the hard-to-manage question whether the
legislature has exceeded the permissible level of discretion, but pose
instead the far more manageable question whether the agency has
been given the discretion to decide something that (under the
appropriate canon) only legislatures may decide. In other words,
courts ask a question about subject matter, not a question about
degree. Putting courts to one side, the nondelegation canons have
the salutary function of ensuring that certain important rights and
interests will not be compromised unless Congress has expressly
decided to compromise them. Thus the nondelegation canons lack a
central defect of the conventional doctrine: While a reinvigorated
nondelegation doctrine would not improve the operation of modern
regulation, it is entirely reasonable to think that for certain kinds of
decisions, merely executive decisions are not enough.
If, for example, an agency is attempting on its own to apply
domestic law extraterritorially, we might think that whatever its
expertise, it is inappropriate, as a matter of democratic theory and
international relations, for this to happen unless Congress has
decided that it should. Or courts might reasonably believe that
retroactive application of regulatory law is acceptable not because the
executive believes that an ambiguous law should be so construed, but
if and only if Congress has reached this conclusion. This judgment
might be founded on the idea that political safeguards will ensure
that Congress will so decide only if there is very good reason for that
decision. For those who believe that retroactivity is constitutionally
unacceptable, this may be insufficient consolation. But a requirement
that Congress make the decision on its own is certainly less likely to
make abuses less common, if they are legitimately characterized as
abuses at all. Many of the canons discussed above fall within this
94
Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
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basic account—above all, perhaps, the idea that agencies may not
raise serious constitutional questions on their own.
This point has the considerable advantage of understanding the
nondelegation canons as a modern incarnation of the framers’ basic
project of linking individual rights and interests with institutional
design.95 The link comes from providing protection of certain rights
and interests not through a flat judicial ban on governmental action,
but through a requirement—that certain controversial or unusual
actions will occur only with respect for the institutional safeguards
introduced through the design of Congress. There is thus a close
connection between the nondelegation canons and a central
aspiration of the constitutional structure.
It would be possible to object at this point that the
nondelegation canons will, in practice, operate as more than
presumptions. At least in most cases, congressional inertia, and
multiple demands on Congress’ time, will mean that the result
ordained by the canon will prevail for the foreseeable future. If this is
the case, nondelegation canons will not “force” legislative
deliberation but simply produce a (judicially preferred?) result. But
there are three problems with this objection. First, Congress will
sometimes respond to the judicial decision by legislating with clarity;
this has happened many times in the past. Second, the nondelegation
canons—to deserve support—must rest on something other than
judicial policy preferences; they must have some kind of foundation
in concerns by the sort identified above. Third, there is nothing to
lament about a situation in which, for example, statutes may not be
applied retroactively, or extraterritorially, without congressional
authorization, and in which Congress is unable to muster the will to
give that authorization. If the argument here is correct, the outcome
ordained by the nondelegation canon should prevail unless Congress
has said otherwise.
B. Qualifications and Futures
There are some important limitations to the argument here. Of
course many canons, including those here, operate even when
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agencies are not involved.96 Nothing I have said operates as a defense
of canons except insofar as they operate as checks on agency
authority. It would be necessary to look elsewhere to justify canons
that do not involve an exercise of discretion by administrative
agencies. If we lean very hard on the notion of judicially
underenforced constitutional norms, we might be able to begin such
a justification97; but that is a different topic.
Nor have I suggested that the nondelegation canons accomplish
precisely the same goals as the old nondelegation doctrine, or for that
matter vice versa. There are several important differences. For its
defenders, the nondelegation doctrine is supposed to operate as a
general or global requirement that Congress make the basic
judgments of value.98 The nondelegation canons have a
conspicuously more limited office. Consider, for example, the
authority of the Federal Communications Commission to give out
broadcasting licenses in accordance with “public interest,
convenience, and necessity.”99 Those who believe in the
nondelegation doctrine would want to invalidate this authority. By
contrast, a nondelegation canon would operate to forbid the FCC to
exercise its authority in such a way as to create serious first
amendment questions, by, for example, requiring broadcasters to
provide free air time for candidates for public office.100 A ruling to
this effect limits FCC discretion, but only in a narrow, targeted way.
Certainly a world of nondelegation canons would impose far fewer
and weaker constraints on FCC authority than a world in which the
nondelegation doctrine were vigorously enforced. Thus those who
believe in that doctrine and urge its revival would undoubtedly
96
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conclude that the nondelegation canons achieve far too little. My
basic response to this objection is that the nondelegation canons are
far preferable, because they are easily administrable, impose a much
less serious strain on judicial capacities, and promise to do more good
while also producing less harm.
We have also seen that many people are skeptical of the
conventional nondelegation doctrine, and for good reasons.101 Ought
they also to be skeptical of nondelegation canons? Do the objections
to the conventional doctrine apply to the contemporary one? Part of
the answer depends on the particular canons in question. But insofar
as the concern involves judicial competence, the nondelegation
canons are far less troublesome, simply because they do not require
judges to resolve a hard issue about degree (how much discretion is
too much discretion?) and allow judges instead to draw clear lines
(for example, if the statute is ambiguous, it may not be applied
extraterritorially). Nor do the nondelegation canons create serious
risks to the operation of the regulatory state. Their narrower office is
to ensure congressional deliberation on issues of great sensitivity.
Nothing in the nondelegation canons runs afoul of the reasonable
concerns of those who are skeptical about the conventional doctrine.
The most important future debates will involve not the existence
or legitimacy of nondelegation canons, but their particular content.
Of course the category changes over time. As noted, a core
nondelegation canon of the early twentieth century required a clear
legislative statement to authorize an interference with common law
rights. Of course this canon is no longer reflected in current law. By
contrast, the idea that statutes will be construed so as to require de
minimis exceptions is relatively new, a creation of the late twentieth
century, a self-conscious judicial response to certain problems in
regulatory law. It would be easy to imagine the introduction of new
canons and the repudiation of current ones. I have attempted to
sketch defenses of existing nondelegation canons, in order to
understand the basis for the review that the relevant issues may not
be resolved bureaucratically. But nothing in the general account
depends on whether any particular canons are defensible.
A distinctive objection to the nondelegation canons, as
catalogued here, is that they are numerous and potentially unruly,
101
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and in that way threaten to produce a complex legal system, one that
imposes costs on litigants and those seeking to know the context of
the law. By contrast, a simple version of the Chevron principle,
allowing agencies to interpret ambiguous provisions, promises to
hold down decision costs and also to promote planning. As a general
rule, this is an important point about any system of multiple
“canons,” and it may argue in favor of greater simplicity, and more
clarity, than current law provides. In practice, however, the existing
system of nondelegation canons does not leave a great deal of
uncertainty, except perhaps in the decision (inevitably complex in
some cases) whether the statute at issue is ambiguous. In
contemporary administrative law, the real lack of clarity comes not
from nondelegation canons, but from general uncertainty about
Chevron itself, which different courts, and panels, apply with
noticeably different degrees of enthusiasm.
V. Conclusion
In this Essay I have argued on behalf of recognizing
nondelegation canons as a distinctive feature of modern public law.
The function of these canons—the modern nondelegation
doctrine—is to ban Congress from authorizing administrative
agencies, or the executive branch, from making certain decisions.102
These canons do not merely operate as nondelegation principles;
they are the thing itself. They show that the nondelegation doctrine
is alive and well. It has merely been relocated and left unnamed.
My principal point has been descriptive—to help in
understanding and unifying a set of outcomes that might otherwise
seem puzzling or even incoherent. But there are normative points as
well. The nondelegation canons have important advantages over the
conventional nondelegation doctrine insofar as they impose fewer
strains on judicial capacities and do not threaten, as the conventional
doctrine would, to harm rather than improve the operation of the
regulatory state. As a class, the nondelegation canons are best
defended on the ground that certain decisions are ordinarily expected
to be made by the national legislature, with its various institutional
102
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safeguards, and not via the executive alone. In this way the
nondelegation canons take their place as one of most prominent
domains in which protection of individual rights, and of other
important interests, occurs not through blanket prohibitions on
governmental action, but through channeling decisions to particular
governmental institutions, in this case Congress itself.103

103
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